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Security Council

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S/1999/1127
4 November 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1240 (1999) of 15 May 1999 by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) to 15 November 1999. It brings up to date developments in Tajikistan and the activities of UNMOT since my interim report of 12 August 1999 (S/1999/872).

II. MAIN DEVELOPMENTS

2. The implementation of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan (A/52/219-S/1997/510, annex I) reached important benchmarks during the reporting period, notably, the lifting of the ban on political parties belonging to the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) on 13 August and the holding of a referendum on changes and amendments to the Constitution on 26 September, as scheduled. However, controversy over the registration of candidates for the presidential election, which is scheduled for 6 November, prompted the UTO to suspend its participation in the work of the Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR) on 18 October.

3. Four candidates are seeking election as President: Emomali S. Rakhmonov of the People's Democratic Party, the incumbent, Saifiddin Turayev of the Party of Justice of Tajikistan, Sulton Kuvvatov of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (Tehran Platform) and Davlat Usmon of the Islamic Revival Party, representing the UTO. According to the law on presidential elections, nominees are required to submit the signatures of 5 per cent of the electorate, namely, 145,000 individuals, to register as candidates with the Central Commission on Elections and Referenda (CCER). Only President Rakhmonov has collected the necessary signatures. The other three candidates have not and they have complained that they have been prevented from doing so by intimidation and obstruction at the local level. On 7 October, they called for an extraordinary session of Parliament to postpone the date of the election and to take administrative measures against government officials who had created obstacles in the course of the collection of signatures or else they would boycott the election.

4. In an ongoing effort to contain the emerging crisis, Ivo Petrov, my Special Representative, together with Marin Buhoara, Head of the Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Tajikistan, attended a meeting of the CCER with the three candidates on 9 October. Following that meeting, and in response to their complaints, the CCER extended the deadline for registration a second time, until 11 October, and requested local government bodies to facilitate the collection of signatures. It did not, however, take action to investigate the allegations made by the three candidates. On 12 October, the CCER decided not to register the three candidates owing to their failure to submit the necessary signatures.

5. On 10 October, the UTO recalled its four representatives on the CCER in protest. The following day, the three candidates appealed to Abdullo Nuri, leader of the UTO, in his capacity as Chairman of the CNR, to support them and the same day the CNR recommended that the three candidates lodge a complaint with the Supreme Court of Tajikistan.

6. On 14 October, Mr. Nuri, in his capacity as leader of the UTO, issued an ultimatum calling for, inter alia, an extraordinary session of Parliament to postpone the date of the presidential election; the removal of obstacles to the collection of signatures; equal access to the media for all candidates; the inclusion of representatives of all parties at all levels of the CCER; and the direct supervision of the presidential election by the United Nations, OSCE and other international bodies. On 18 October, the UTO suspended its participation in the CNR. The following day, Akbar Turajonzodah, the first deputy leader of the UTO and First Deputy Prime Minister, who had opposed the position taken by Mr. Nuri, was expelled from the UTO and from the Islamic Revival Party.

7. In a meeting with the Contact Group of Guarantor States and International Organizations on 16 October, President Rakhmonov expressed regret that other candidates would not participate in the presidential election. He added that if the Supreme Court found that district government authorities had created impediments to the collection of signatures, disciplinary measures would be taken against those responsible in accordance with the law.

8. On 21 October, the Supreme Court decided that it did not have the competence to consider violations that had allegedly taken place at the local level and directed the parties to address their grievances to the local courts. The Court further decided that the CCER should allow the registration of Davlat Usmon, on the basis of testimony heard from a member of the CCER that Mr. Usmon had said he had collected the requisite number of signatures. Thus, on 22 October, Mr. Usmon was registered by the CCER. Mr. Usmon himself repeatedly maintained that he had not collected the necessary signatures. On 1 November, the CCER announced it had put Mr. Usmon's name on the ballot papers, together with that of President Rakhmonov.

9. On 25 and 26 October, the Contact Group met with Government and UTO members of the CNR, emphasizing the need to proceed on some key CNR issues, such as the drafting of the law on parliamentary elections. At the suggestion of my Special Representative, the CNR agreed to set up a working group that would prepare a document containing political guarantees for preparation of parliamentary elections in an atmosphere free of violations and obstacles. The aim of the

working group is to obtain assurances from the political leadership that the obstacles, impediments and other difficulties alleged to have been created during the presidential election are eliminated during the parliamentary elections. Mr. Nuri suggested that the working group also discuss ways to overcome the present difficulties related to the presidential election. Abdulmadjid Dostiev, the Deputy Chairman of the CNR, for his part, wanted the working group to focus solely on the provisions of the General Agreement, which does not mention the presidential election since it was meant to be implemented well before that election was due. The scope of the working group's mandate was taken up at its first meeting, held on 27 October and chaired by UNMOT. At the time of writing, UNMOT is working with the two sides to come to an agreement on the issue.

10. The above developments have inevitably cast a shadow on the parliamentary elections, due to be held before the expiration of the term of the present Parliament at the end of February 2000. On the assumption that the present difficulties will be overcome, the United Nations, in cooperation with OSCE, is preparing for international monitoring of the electoral process. A third joint OSCE/United Nations assessment mission will travel to Tajikistan after the CNR resumes its work to monitor the preparations for the parliamentary elections and to advise the Government on what needs to be done in order to meet international standards.

Constitutional referendum

11. The referendum on changes and amendments to the Constitution took place on 26 September. According to the CCER, 72 per cent of those who cast their vote approved the amendments, namely (a) the establishment of a two-chamber Parliament; (b) the election of members of the Lower Chamber on the basis of equal, direct and secret vote; (c) the election of 75 per cent of the Upper Chamber by the local parliaments, with the remaining 25 per cent to be appointed by the President; (d) the establishment of a Judicial Council, which will participate in appointing and dismissing judges at various levels; (e) a clause permitting the functioning of political parties based on religion and (f) the extension of the term of the President from five to seven years with no possibility of re-election.

Ban on political parties

12. Following the declaration by the UTO of the disbandment of its armed forces (see S/1999/872, para. 2), on 13 August the Supreme Court of Tajikistan lifted the ban on UTO political parties and movements, namely, the Islamic Revival Party, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (Almaty Platform), the Lali Badakhshan Movement and the Rostahez Movement. On 18 September, the Islamic Revival Party held its first congress since 1993. Delegates amended the Party's charter, bringing it in line with the requirements of the new Law on Political Parties as revised in November 1998. The Ministry of Justice subsequently re-registered the party, allowing it to participate fully in all political activities. On 7 September, the Islamic Revival Party newspaper, Najot, was published legally for the first time since the 1993 ban.

13. The Democratic Party of Tajikistan (Almaty Platform) held its first congress since 1993 on 25 September. It has not, however, been able to re-register because another party had already registered under the same name. The two are exploring ways to resolve their differences and perhaps to merge in the future. The registration of the Lali Badakhshan Movement and the Rostahez Movement is pending.

Amnesty

14. The two-member CNR panel established following the signing of the 17 June Protocol between President Rakhmonov and Mr. Nuri had recommended the release of 47 UTO supporters imprisoned for criminal charges (see S/1999/872, para. 11). The President subsequently granted amnesty to 40 of them in two separate decrees. Their release is still pending. Of the remaining seven prisoners, two were executed and two died before the decrees were issued; three prisoners were found not to be eligible for amnesty.

Power-sharing

15. During the reporting period 2 UTO representatives were appointed to posts at the district and city level, bringing the total at that level to 14. No new appointments were made to central government posts beyond those reported previously.

Contact Group

16. The Contact Group of Guarantor States and International Organizations continued to support the peace process. It met repeatedly with the CNR to review shortcomings in the implementation of the General Agreement and to help overcome difficulties.

Reintegration of former fighters

17. Following the public declaration by the UTO of the disarmament and disbandment of the UTO, a nation-wide disarmament campaign was conducted from 5 to 25 August with the participation of members of the CNR and other high-ranking personalities. Delegations travelled throughout the country, urging that weapons be turned over to the authorities. The final results of the campaign were disappointing, however. It is believed that the majority of serviceable weapons remain in the hands of former UTO fighters, other groups and the population at large. None of the artillery pieces and weapons brought back by a UTO group from Afghanistan in 1998 were handed in.

18. Previous government reports had stated that 6,039 places had been set aside for former UTO fighters in the armed forces, police and security forces. According to the latest CNR reports, however, only 2,309 former fighters had been integrated in those structures, while another 2,370 had been demobilized. Relatively few of the fighters have actually been integrated into the chain of command or are being provided salaries, uniforms, food and accommodation. The Tajik Border Forces appear to have made the most substantial progress in that regard.

19. The job-creation projects for former fighters carried out by the United Nations Office for Project Services continued. A total of 1,130 persons are now employed in 52 projects, covering five districts in the Karategin Valley. Of these, 836 are former UTO fighters, 50 are war widows and 244 are technical experts drawn from the local communities. The amount allocated at present is $2 million; while $1.15 million from the United States of America, $500,000 from Norway and $350,000 from Canada. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) administers the funds.

Police

20. During August and September, UNMOT conducted courses on human dignity and the police in three separate modules, introducing a total of 120 police trainers to the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. The response was positive and there have been requests for additional courses to be held both in Dushanbe and in other regions.

Security

21. With the exception of the eastern part of the Karategin Valley, the situation remained relatively calm. In mid-August, an armed group reportedly belonging to an extremist Uzbek faction took several hostages in the south-western area of Kyrgyzstan, near the Tajik border. Among the hostages were Kyrgyz servicemen, civilians and four Japanese citizens and their interpreter. The group reportedly crossed into Tajikistan with the hostages, prompting air attacks by Uzbek armed forces. The hostages were released in stages, with the last being freed on 25 October.

22. On 29 October, an armed clash reportedly took place in the area of Darband, in the Karategin Valley, between members of the Presidential Guard and a group formerly belonging to the UTO. The latter is reportedly blocking the entrance to the Karategin Valley, which links the eastern regions to the rest of the country.

23. In Dushanbe and elsewhere there continued to be reports of criminal violence and of sporadic clashes among individual members of the UTO and between them and government servicemen.

Humanitarian activities

24. Since the beginning of the year, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has assisted in the voluntary repatriation of 4,119 Tajik refugees from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. These repatriations were carried out with the cooperation of the CNR Subcommission on Refugees.

25. The humanitarian operations of the United Nations system continued to include life-saving interventions and programmes aimed at stabilizing populations at risk, complementing the job-creation projects for former fighters. Currently, the consolidated inter-agency appeal for 2000 is being prepared as a strategic document that will guide a gradual transition to a more development-oriented focus. Previous appeals and donor conferences organized in

1997 and 1998 have resulted in very low actual disbursement of funds. In August and September, UNDP entered into final discussions with the Asian Development Bank and the Government of Tajikistan concerning the role of the United Nations Office for Project Services as implementing partner of a $20 million social sector grant to the Government of Tajikistan.

Organizational matters

26. As of October 1999, UNMOT comprised 167 civilian staff, of whom 50 were internationally recruited, including 3 United Nations Volunteers, and 37 military observers from Austria (3), Bangladesh (3), Bulgaria (3), the Czech Republic (3), Denmark (2), Ghana (2), Indonesia (2), Jordan (6), Nepal (2), Nigeria (2), Poland (3), the Ukraine (3) and Uruguay (3). A four-member medical unit from Bangladesh and Jordan is included in the above. There are two civilian police officers from Denmark and Poland.

27. In addition to its headquarters in Dushanbe, UNMOT maintained field offices in Kurgan-Tyube, Khorog and Khujand. It continued to observe strict security measures and maintain close contact with the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States and liaison with the Russian border forces.

28. Ivo Petrov assumed his functions as my Special Representative on 2 October. Brigadier General John Hvidegaard (Denmark) continued as Chief Military Observer.

III. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

29. The General Assembly, in its resolution 53/19 B of 8 June 1999, appropriated an amount of $18.7 million gross for the maintenance of UNMOT for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNMOT at its current strength beyond 15 November 1999, the monthly cost of maintaining the Mission would be approximately $1.6 million.

30. As at 30 September 1999, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNMOT from the inception of the Mission to 15 November 1999 amounted to $7.4 million, which represents some 12 per cent of the assessment for the Mission. The unpaid assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to $1.8 billion.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

31. During the last three months, the peace process in Tajikistan has made further progress, with the constitutional referendum and the lifting of the ban on UTO political parties, both important milestones. The last major event of the transition period envisaged in the General Agreement will be the parliamentary elections, to be held before the term of the current parliament expires at the end of February 2000.

32. As the transition period nears its end, UNMOT approaches the completion of its assignment. Although the peace process has been marred by recurrent serious crises and the implementation of the General Agreement has been far from perfect, it has served its fundamental purpose, which was to set Tajikistan on the course of national reconciliation and democratization. That this has indeed happened is in no small measure due to the at times extraordinary efforts of UNMOT and the active support of the guarantor States and international organizations that make up the Contact Group.

33. Close international involvement remains essential to assist Tajikistan in any political tensions, to ensure that they are resolved by peaceful means rather than by violence, for which, regrettably the potential remains. In this context, there is a continuing requirement for supporting measures such as job creation for former fighters and the monitoring of the process leading to the election of the new Parliament, both of which depend on voluntary funding.

34. In the circumstances, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNMOT for another six months, until 15 May 2000. I envisage this as the last extension of the mandate, since the process of transition stipulated in the General Agreement will come to an end during that period. However, it is widely held that a continued political presence of the United Nations would greatly assist in ensuring that Tajikistan can consolidate the path of peace and national reconciliation. Therefore, I intend to outline in an interim report following the parliamentary elections, a possible political role for the United Nations in this respect that the Security Council may wish to consider.

35. Finally, I should like to pay tribute to Mr. Ivo Petrov, my Special Representative, and to the men and women serving with him for the exemplary manner in which they have continued to discharge their responsibilities. I should also like to thank the countries contributing military personnel to UNMOT for their cooperation and support during this period.



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Map No. 3897 Rev. 21 UNITED NATIONS
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Cartographic Section

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LETTER DATED 4 NOVEMBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that at 1106 hours on 27 October 1999 a formation of United States and British warplanes dropped five heat flares in an area north of Mosul in Ninawa Governorate, alarming the local residents.

I ask you to intervene with the countries that engage in aggression against Iraq on a daily basis in the illegal no-flight zones, as well as with the countries that provide basing facilities for the United States and British aircraft involved, with a view to halting and preventing any future repetition of unwarranted actions that are in breach of the Charter of the United Nations and international law since they constitute a flagrant violation of Iraq's sovereignty, cause damage to the property of citizens and alarm large numbers of people. I also affirm Iraq's legally established right, in accordance with the principle of international responsibility, to seek compensation for the damage done to it by the actions in which these aircraft engage.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Saeed H. HASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-33018 (E) 051199 051199

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1999/1129
4 November 1999
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LETTER DATED 4 NOVEMBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 3 November 1999 from Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, concerning the State terrorism in which the United States engages against Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Saeed H. HASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-33024 (E) 051199 051199

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Annex

Letter dated 3 November 1999 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

I refer to the letter dated 5 June 1999 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to you concerning actions taken by the Government of the United States of America against the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and that Government's blatant interference in Iraq's internal affairs (S/1999/651, annex).

On the present occasion, I should like to call your attention to a report published by The New York Times in its issue for 28 October 1999 concerning the military training that the United States is to provide for mercenary groups of Iraqi nationals collaborating with its intelligence agencies so that it may use them as its instruments for conspiring against Iraq.

The report states, inter alia, that:

"The Administration has authorized the first direct military training for opponents of President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, senior officials said today. ...

"... American officials will school them on how to organize a military in an emerging State. Other courses are being prepared.

...

"... The officials said they expected to offer space to more Iraqis in other Pentagon courses. ...

"... While the Central Intelligence Agency has provided covert support to Iraqi dissidents in the past, this is the first overt military assistance. ..."

The foregoing leaves no room for doubt that the provision of funding and training to these terrorists by the United States of America means that it is a State that sponsors international terrorism. The action in question also comes within days of the adoption by consensus of Security Council resolution 1269 (1999), and this provides a further indication of the contempt in which the United States holds the resolutions of the Security Council. This new action is also in flagrant violation of the resolution itself, and in particular of its fourth, seventh and eighth preambular paragraphs, by which the Council emphasizes "the necessity to intensify the fight against terrorism at the national level and to strengthen ... effective international cooperation in this field on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and norms of international law", states its determination "to contribute ... to the efforts to combat terrorism in all its forms" and reaffirms "that the suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which States

are involved, is an essential contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security".

Such actions on the part of the United States against Iraq require the international community and its institutions to respond with the rejection and condemnation they deserve. The United States is a permanent member of the Security Council, and it thus has obligations under the Charter with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security. When it breaches its obligations under these principles, it destroys the legal foundations that have been laid by the international community for the conduct of relations between States and places international peace and security in the greatest jeopardy.

The United Nations has a legal and moral responsibility to defend the principles of the Charter, to oppose attempts to undermine the unity and independence of its Member States and to reject a United States policy that seeks to return the international community to the law of the jungle and the rule of brute force. Until such time as the international community and its institutions take action to halt these hostile practices, the people of Iraq will continue its defiance of American State terrorism in order to preserve its territorial integrity, its independence and its right to a life of dignity and to defend the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law and the right of peoples to self-determination.

(Signed) Tariq AZIZ
Deputy Prime Minister
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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5 November 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1234 (1999) of 9 April 1999 and 1258 (1999) of 6 August 1999 and the statements of its President of 31 August 1998 (S/PRST/1998/26), 11 December 1998 (S/PRST/1998/36) and 24 June 1999 (S/PRST/1999/17),

Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and all States in the region,

Reaffirming also that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815) represents a viable basis for a resolution of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General of 1 November 1999 (S/1999/1116),

Noting with satisfaction the deployment of United Nations military liaison personnel to the capitals of the States signatories to the Ceasefire Agreement and to the Joint Military Commission established by them, and underlining the importance of their full deployment as provided for in its resolution 1258 (1999),

Noting also that the Joint Military Commission and the Political Committee have held meetings as mandated under the Ceasefire Agreement,

Urging all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement to cooperate fully with the technical survey team despatched to the Democratic Republic of the Congo by the Secretary-General as indicated in his report of 15 July 1999 (S/1999/790), in order to allow it to assess conditions and to prepare for subsequent United Nations deployments in the country,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations military liaison personnel deployed under paragraph 8 of resolution 1258 (1999) until 15 January 2000;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to report to it regularly on developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo including on the future presence of the United Nations in the country in support of the peace process;

3. Calls on all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement to continue to abide by its provisions;

4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1999/1131
8 November 1999
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IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 6 NOVEMBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that violations of Iraq's airspace by United States and British aircraft based in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey continued between 24 and 31 October 1999 and that the aircraft in question engaged in acts of aggression, reconnaissance activities and acts of provocation, as set forth in the annex hereto.

You are requested to intervene with the United States, the United Kingdom and the countries that provide the facilities for these acts of aggression, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey, with a view to bringing a halt to actions that, as flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.

These actions are continuing to bring death and injury to hundreds of civilians and to cause serious damage to private and public property. The logistic support that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey provide to the United States and British forces makes them key partners in the aggression being committed against Iraq, so that they share international responsibility for the consequences of these actions. The Republic of Iraq affirms its right to seek lawful compensation for the damage being inflicted on its people by these same actions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Saeed H. HASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-33453 (E) 091199 091199

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Annex

Violations by United States and British aircraft and damage caused, 24-31 October 1999

1. In the northern region 55 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 12,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 1030 hours on 25 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 19 missions from Turkish territory, were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho, Amadiyah and Aqrah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1340 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 1100 hours on 27 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 20 missions, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Aqrah, Tall Afar, Rawanduz, Baibo and Ayn Zalah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1405 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 1100 hours on 28 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Turkish territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 16 missions from Turkish territory, were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Zakho, Amadiyah, Dohuk, Mosul, Tall Afar and Ayn Zalah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1305 hours, drove them off.

2. In the southern region 327 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 9,000 to 13,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 0640 hours on 24 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 24 missions from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft and overflew the Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman and Ushbayjah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 0935 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 0635 hours on 25 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 46 missions, 22 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 24 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Samawah, Nasiriyah, Lasaf, Umm Qasr, Artawi, Busayyah, Basrah, Salman and Shinafiyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 0905 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 1430 hours on 26 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 36 missions, 30 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS aircraft and 6 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Artawi, Lasaf, Ansab and Busayyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1725 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 0910 hours on 28 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 18 missions, 12 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft and 6 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Salman, Ma'aniyah, Diwaniyah South, Busayyah, Lasaf and Shinafiyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1110 hours, drove them off.

(e) At 1530 hours on 29 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 72 missions, 49 of them from Saudi territory and 23 from Kuwaiti territory, and were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and an E-2C aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Busayyah, Samawah, Lasaf, Ushbayjah, Salman, Amarah, Ali al-Gharbi, Nu'maniyah, Kut, Karbala', Razzazah, Najaf and Artawi areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1645 hours, drove them off.

(f) At 1730 hours on 30 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 97 missions, 64 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft and 33 from Kuwaiti territory with the support of an E-2C aircraft. They overflew the Nasiriyah, Afak, Hashimiyah, Taqtaqanah, Najaf, Hayy, Diwaniyah, Jalibah, Qal'at Salih, Amarah, Salman, Shinafiyah, Qurnah and Ukhaydir areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 0100 hours, drove them off.

(g) At 1730 hours on 31 October 1999 United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from Saudi and Kuwaiti territory penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 34 missions from Saudi territory, were supported by an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and overflew the Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Najaf, Diwaniyah, Afak, Jalibah, Artawi and Busayyah areas. Our air defences, acting in self-defence, engaged the aircraft and, at 1825 hours, drove them off.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 NOVEMBER 1999 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

As you are aware, as my Special Envoy in Africa, Mohammed Sahnoun has been actively engaged, in collaboration with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United States of America, in efforts to help resolve the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Those efforts helped to facilitate the conclusion of the OAU Framework Agreement and the modalities for its implementation, both of which were accepted by the two parties. The Technical Arrangements, which were prepared in Algiers by OAU, the United States of America and the United Nations with Mr. Sahnoun's active participation, to assist further the implementation of the Framework Agreement were accepted by Eritrea. Clarification was provided to the questions raised by Ethiopia on some of the provisions of the Technical Arrangements and efforts are continuing to obtain Ethiopia's acceptance. Mr. Sahnoun is fully involved in those efforts.

Moreover, I have decided to ask Mr. Sahnoun also to follow developments in other countries in the Horn of Africa subregion, especially Somalia and the Sudan, and to represent me in meetings on the two countries of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IEAD) and the IEAD Partners Forum.

For these reasons, I have decided to extend the appointment of Mr. Sahnoun as my Adviser on Africa until 31 December 2000.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

99-33180 (E) 051199

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1133
5 November 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 NOVEMBER 1999 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 2 November 1999 (S/1999/1132) concerning your decision to extend the appointment of Mohammed Sahnoun as your Adviser until 31 December 2000 has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the decision contained in your letter.

(Signed) Danilo TÜRK
President of the Security Council

99-33186 (E) 051199

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1133*
11 November 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 NOVEMBER 1999 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 2 November 1999 (S/1999/1132) concerning your decision to extend the appointment of Mohammed Sahnoun as your Adviser on Africa until 31 December 2000 has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the decision contained in your letter.

(Signed) Danilo TÜRK
President of the Security Council

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

99-34066 (E) 111199

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1134
5 November 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 NOVEMBER 1999 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

As members of the Security Council are aware, since its establishment on 15 April 1995, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) has been monitoring closely the situation in and relating to Somalia and assisting me in providing periodic briefings and written reports to the Council. UNPOS has also continued to assist my efforts to advance the cause of peace and reconciliation in Somalia, in consultations with Somalis and the States and organizations concerned.

In September 1997, the members of the Council supported a more active role for the United Nations in coordinating international mediation efforts on Somalia and agreed with my decision to strengthen UNPOS, whose activities were described most recently in my report of 16 August 1999 (S/1999/882). Given the very important and useful role of UNPOS and the support expressed by the Security Council for continued United Nations involvement in the search for peace in Somalia, I would appreciate the support of the Council for my decision to continue the activities of the Office for the biennium 2000-2001. The activities of UNPOS could be expanded and its staff strengthened with the approval of the Security Council in the context of its review of the role of the United Nations in Somalia.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

99-33192 (E) 051199

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1137
5 November 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 NOVEMBER 1999 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 2 November 1999 (S/1999/1136) concerning your intention to extend the United Nations Office in Burundi until the end of December 2000 has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention contained in your letter.

(Signed) Danilo TÜRK
President of the Security Council

99-33210 (E) 051199

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1138
5 November 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 NOVEMBER 1999 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

As you are aware, the United Nations continues to support the Arusha peace process on Burundi, which has taken place under the facilitation of the late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere. In my letter of 15 October 1998 (S/1998/968), I informed the Security Council of my decision to appoint, as a commitment to our longstanding support to the facilitation, Ayité Jean-Claude Kpakpo (Benin) as Senior United Nations Adviser to the Facilitator of the Burundi peace process.

The Burundi peace process has entered a critical stage. Our support for the process has become more vital than ever. Unfortunately, hopes that a general peace agreement would be concluded by the end of 1999 are unlikely to be fulfilled because of the emergence of new obstacles that have delayed the process.

I have therefore decided to extend the appointment of Mr. Kpakpo until June 2000.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

99-33222 (E) 051199

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1139
5 November 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 NOVEMBER 1999 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 2 November 1999 (S/1999/1138) concerning your decision to extend the appointment of Ayité Jean-Claude Kpakpo (Benin) as Senior United Nations Adviser to the Facilitator of the Burundi peace process until June 2000 has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the decision contained in your letter.

(Signed) Danilo TÜRK
President of the Security Council

99-33228 (E) 051199

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/1140
5 November 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 NOVEMBER 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ERITREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to forward the attached press release issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Eritrea on 5 November 1999 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would kindly circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Haile MENKERIOS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-33252 (E) 051199

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Annex

Press release issued on 5 November 1999 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Eritrea

The status quo ante is the colonial boundaries

Overly enchanted with the term, the Ethiopian Government keeps harping on the imperative "of restoring the status quo ante" as a precondition for peace. This is either hypocritical or missing the whole point. The fact is that, despite its lip service, it is the Addis Ababa regime that has violated the status quo to provoke and trigger the war. In this respect, its invasion of Adi Murgu (Bada) in 1997 to dismantle the sovereign Eritrean administration, its issuance of a new, illegal map in October 1997 that slices large tracts of sovereign Eritrean territory in violation of the sanctity of colonial boundaries and its pattern of encroachment in the Badme area to occupy several Eritrean villages are all instances of naked aggression and the alteration of the stable status quo through illegal and forcible means.

As Eritrea has maintained from the beginning, the restoration of the status quo ante is nothing more than respect of, and a reversion to, the colonial boundaries that the Ethiopian regime has brazenly violated. The primary aim of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) peace package is to ensure respect of colonial boundaries - and hence restoration of the stable status quo ante - through demarcation. But Addis Ababa is obstructing this by refusing to contemplate demarcation of the boundary in accordance with inherited and sacrosanct colonial boundaries. A violation of this principle of international law will set a dangerous precedent for Ethiopia itself (its dispute with Somalia over the Ogaden) and open a Pandora's box in Africa.

Interim redeployment of the troops of both countries is not going to restore the status quo ante, as the regime in Addis Ababa insinuates. Redeployment does not, indeed, constitute the kernel of the solution and the Technical Arrangements do not contain "loopholes" in this or other aspects of the peace package.

As the Framework and Technical Arrangements clarify, redeployment of forces to areas that will be determined by the Neutral Commission is an interim measure that is necessary to create a conducive climate for demarcation. It is not, otherwise, confirmation of sovereignty of either country. Article 3 of the Technical Arrangements in fact states: "redeployment shall not prejudice the final status of the territories concerned, it being understood that this status will be determined at the end of the delimitation and demarcation process".

The OAU peace package has comprehensive and detailed provisions for restoring the status quo ante by securing the cessation of hostilities and the placement of a peacekeeping mission to monitor interim redeployment of troops so as to guarantee the demarcation of the boundary. This peace package is being held hostage because of the Ethiopian regime continues to obstruct it under this

or that redundant argument. The ball is thus in its court. If the regime in Addis Ababa continues to abuse the patience of the international community to frustrate peace and unleash war, it shall bear sole responsibility for all the consequences.